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Commentary and Debate: Special Section
Media Governance:
New ways to regulate the media
LEEN D’HAENENS
The following set of reflections emerged from a panel session that took
place in June 2006 in Dresden as part of the International Communication
Association, and out of a lively interaction among the six authors. We
thought that the outcome of this reflection on the concept of media gover-
nance framed from different perspectives, from a philosophical concept to
its diverse applications in the European Union, was important enough to
dedicate a Commentary and Debate section to so that other people who
were not in attendance could read it and share their visions with the editors.
There are good grounds to introduce self- and co-regulation in the media
sector. For example the flexibility needed due to a rapidly changing (soci-
etal and technological) context, the constitutional reasons for a distance
between politics and the media, as well as the fact that goals of pluralism
and diversity are difficult to operationalize into effective laws. It also
proves hard to enforce self-regulation. Therefore, it is important to find the
right mix. ‘Co-regulation’ or ‘regulated self-regulation’ implies an impor-
tant, albeit shared, role for the state. In addition, ‘media governance’ is a
new concept in this respect. This also implies the involvement of civic and
professional groups and mechanisms like public hearings in the process of
media regulation.
Traditional media politics has leaned heavily on the state as central actor
that has tried to achieve pluralism with relatively unclear goals. Those days
seem to be gone for good as in recent decades a “transformation of
statehood” (Latzer et al., 2003: 128) has taken place in the media and
telecommunication sector which can be traced by trends such as a change
from protectionism to promotion of competition, the separation of political
and operative tasks (i. e. independent regulatory authorities), the shift from
vertical (sector-specific) to horizontal regulation, the transition from na-
tional to supra- and international regulation, and the change from state to
self- and co-regulation in which private and societal partners are becoming
more actively involved in regulation.
In this Commentary and Debate section, six authors affiliated with the
Universities of Hamburg and Zurich, and the Austrian Academy of Sci-
ences distinguish between state regulation, co-regulation, and self-regula-
tion and demonstrate that both in the literature and in the policy practice
many alternative forms of regulation on the continuum between state and
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market based on collaborative arrangements between public and private
partners have been elaborated on recently. The idea that market forces can
simply replace government regulation has proven to be naı¨ve. Instead of
deregulation, we should speak of re-regulation. Also, the European Com-
mission has been reflecting on new forms of regulation and governance. Its
White Paper ‘European Governance’ (2001) emphasizes that co-regulation
will be put to practice more and more. Although significant differences from
country to country remain, for example between the Anglo-American legal
model and continental Europe, the concept of the overarching state should
be abandoned. The sovereign state has already made place for a corporate
bargaining state, a partner embarking on partnerships with the industry.
In a theoretical background article, Patrick Donges demonstrates that
media governance has gained in importance over the last few years, both
as a scientific and theoretical approach for the analysis of media regulation
and as a practical approach for new ways to regulate the media. He dis-
cusses the theoretical foundation of media governance, defines the term as
a dynamic structure of rules among actors who are linked in different net-
works, connecting it to the new institutionalism concept in sociology.
Following up on this, Manuel Puppis considers media governance as
a horizontal extension of government, covering not only statutory media
regulation but also self- and co-regulation. These forms of regulation by
private actors respect media freedom, while at the same time inflicting
social responsibility on the media. The author discusses the role of the state
in self-regulation, and argues that the government’s involvement depends
on the governance domain, the type of media platform, as well as national
peculiarities.
Identifying media concentration as a fundamental problem for democ-
racy, Werner Meier and Ire`ne Perrin qualify media policy as increasingly
influenced and controlled by corporate media. The authors’ concept of me-
dia governance deals with the complex relationships of political, economic,
and mass media power structures and is conceptualized as a multi-stake-
holder approach which is supposed to ‘tackle’ complex conflicts of interest.
Such a media governance approach surely is difficult to implement, but in
the end it does not only help to legitimize media companies’ editorial and
corporate actions but it also assumes their obligations towards society.
Michael Latzer tackles the question of how to decide on the adequate
mix of state and alternative regulation from a public-policy perspective.
Based on the weighing of advantages and disadvantages of various modes
of regulation and on international experiences with different regulatory
modes, the author presents a rough guideline for regulatory and institu-
tional choice. This model may assist decision-makers in assessing regula-
tory institutional arrangements for regulatory problems in the communica-
tion sector.
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 08.12.17 16:31
Patrick Donges 325
Adopting a comparative approach, Matthias Kuenzler assesses the par-
ticipation of the state in self-regulation as a potential key success factor
(or not) for media governance. To this end, the author presents results from
two empirical studies illustrating that the success of a state’s participation
depends on the domain of governance and that the involvement of the state
is not the only key success factor.
Thorsten Held plays the comparative card even more, assessing the Euro-
pean Commission’s stance as to the inclusion of co-regulatory systems when
drafting the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (modifying and extend-
ing the European ‘Television without Frontiers Directive’). The directive
explicitly allows for co-regulation as a way to implement the directive’s
provisions including those for advertising and the protection of minors. Ac-
cording to article three, the member states shall encourage co-regulatory
regimes in the fields coordinated by the directive. However, the term ‘co-
regulation’ includes a variety of different approaches for different countries
and different sectors. The author briefly sketches some major findings of
his investigations.
Reference
Latzer, M., Just, N., Saurwein, F., and Slominski, P. (2003). Regulation remixed: Insti-
tutional change through self and co-Regulation in the mediamatics sector. Com-
munications and Strategies 50 (2nd quarter 2003), 127157.
The New Institutionalism as a theoretical
foundation of media governance
PATRICK DONGES
Governance as a structure of rules
Governance is a new approach in the discussion on media regulation and
has gained in importance over the last few years. As a more theoretical
approach, we find the concept of governance in several scientific disci-
plines like political science, law, economics, or sociology, where it is ap-
plied to several theoretical levels and for a plurality of research ques-
tions. As a more practical approach, the concept is discussed in several
countries with different traditions in media regulation. Nevertheless, the
question whether governance is just a stylish buzzword or a plausible
and useful approach is still in discussion (e. g., Benz, 2004).
In a broad sense, the concept of governance refers to the relations
between actors and the ways in which these actors reduce specific risks
and uncertainties within their interaction “in order to make cooperation
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possible or easier” (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004: 152). For
the German sociologists Schimank and Lange (2004: 19), governance
generally means a pattern to cope with interdependence between actors.
The notion of ‘pattern’ indicates that governance means both the pro-
cesses of coping with interdependency and the structures wherein these
processes take place. Lange and Schimank (2004: 1922) mention three
basic forms of governance structures: Reciprocal observation, reciprocal
influence, and bargaining.
In a narrower sense, the several notions of governance differ in their
understanding, depending on what problems of interdependence they
focus on. In economics, the basic problem of governance is to control
and to assert rules that have been accepted in a contract by opportunistic
actors (Richter and Furubotn, 1997). In political science, governance re-
fers to the enforcement of collectively binding rules in times where the
state is no longer a homogenous and unitary actor but a network of
actors which are only partially coupled in a hierarchical way (Mayntz,
2005: 15). This is especially the case when processes and structures of
governance cross borders; for instance the borders between organiza-
tions and their environment, between state and society, or the borders
between nations (Benz, 2004: 25). In these cases, policy-making is no
longer a process of setting rules but a complex process of institutional-
ized negotiations within political (not necessarily governmental actors)
and other actors in multilevel systems (e. g., Benz, 2005).
In short, governance refers to the dynamic structure of rules between
actors that are linked in different networks and permanently forced to
negotiate, without a center that has the power to command and control.
As an analytic approach, governance focuses on the impact of these
structures of rules on the actors and their behavior. In an effort to take
the discussion one step further and to answer the ‘buzzword or useful
approach?’ question, the concept of governance has to be connected to
social science theories which highlight such dynamics between structures
and actors. In my opinion, a fruitful theoretical foundation of the gover-
nance approach can be found in institutional theories, especially the new
institutionalism in sociology.
Insights from the new institutionalism in sociology
Within the new institutionalism, institutions can be defined as “symbolic
and behavioral systems containing representational, constitutive and
normative rules together with regulatory mechanisms that define a com-
mon meaning system and give rise to distinctive actors and action rou-
tines” (Scott, 1994: 68). As Barley and Tolbert (1997: 96) pointed out,
institutions are “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of
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social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships.” They are
socially constructed and routine-reproduced, because actors take them
for granted and internalize them (Jepperson, 1991: 149).
According to the new institutionalism, institutions are more than just
the rules of the game. Social actors cannot use institutional rules just the
way they want. Institutional rules are constraints to actors as they limit
their range of behavior. However, they also create actors and enable
them to act. Actors develop their preferences within an institutional envi-
ronment, defined as the “rules and requirements to which [individuals
and] organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legiti-
macy” (Scott and Meyer, 1991: 123).
What can we learn from the new institutionalism for the debate on
media governance? Three points should be emphasized in this respect:
(1) Actors such as media organizations (institutionalized as private or
public companies) or regulatory authorities etc. cannot be consid-
ered decoupled from the institutional setting they emerged from.
Moreover, institutional rules define how organizations observe and
evaluate their environment. Organizations bear their institutional
history inside and cannot shake it off. They are path dependent in
the sense that it is hard to change their structures.
(2) Institutional rules are the basis of media regulation, and all forms of
regulation are always rooted in institutional arrangements. That is
the reason why we can distinguish different models of media and
politics (e. g., Hallin and Mancini, 2004) or different ‘ideas’ or regu-
latory cultures even within Europe (e. g., Cuilenburg and McQuail,
2003; see e. g., Napoli, 1999).
(3) Institutional rules are always the products of decisions made by me-
dia, political, or economic actors. However, the emergence of such
rules is not always intended. “While institutions are certainly the
result of human activity, they are not necessarily the products of
conscious design” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 8). Particularly, a
time lag has to be considered: “The critical agenda for institutional
analysis should be to show how choices made at one point in time
create institutions that generate recognizable patterns of constraints
and opportunities at a later point” (Powell, 1991: 188). Media actors
cannot ‘make’ institutions. However, one has to consider that insti-
tutions emerge, and become accepted only with the help of powerful
actors. Processes of institutionalization are dependent on actors who
support and try to influence these, but once institutionalized, rules
are taken-for-granted, and actors are unlikely to recognize alterna-
tives.
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Institutionalized rules of media governance and media regulation
The following are three connections between media governance as a
structure of rules, the new institutionalism, and media regulation:
(1) Institutionalized rules of media governance are the basis of media
regulation. All forms of regulation build on existing governance
structures and institutionalized rules (path dependency). Such rules
may concern the organizational form of media organizations (pri-
vate, public service), the connection between media organizations
and the state or political actors, or the perception about which regu-
latory decisions are legitimate and which are not. Even a cursory
look at European media systems shows that these normative and
cultural rules differ a lot while the regulatory rules (notion of media
freedom) remain nearly the same.
(2) Institutionalized rules of media governance are the outcome of media
regulation. Regulatory decisions may change governance structures,
even though the change is not always intended. Governance struc-
tures may be complementary or even contradictory, as can be il-
lustrated through the diverging views on the role of public service
broadcasting on a national and the European policy level (see e. g.,
Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003; see e. g., Harrison and Woods,
2001).
(3) Institutionalized rules of media governance may be used (in a re-
stricted way) as an instrument of media regulation. Mainly in Anglo-
Saxon countries, broadcasting policy focuses on the indirect regula-
tion of the process of content production, but not on the content
itself (as in France or Germany). Political actors have the opportu-
nity to take part in the institutionalization of governance structures
by linking several networks of actors, modifying the rules of gover-
nance structures, obliging the actors involved to negotiate rules,
build new kinds of bonds among themselves, and integrate in estab-
lished networks etc. One example is the obligation for public consul-
tations whenever new broadcasting acts are being prepared. This is
a well- known practice in Anglo-Saxon countries like Canada (e. g.,
Raboy, 1994). The regulatory decision to bring the society into pro-
cesses of governance will lead to the establishment of new actors
and will change the existing rules of the game. Structures of media
governance may not be changed dramatically or replaced by a new
order ‘of a piece’, but will only be modified slowly, bit by bit.
Discussion
In short, we consider media governance to have two meanings. First, it
is both a scientific and theoretical approach to analyze different forms
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of media regulation. The governance approach considers media regula-
tion as a process within a network of actors in which the government
may be, but not necessarily has to be involved. As a theoretical ap-
proach, media governance indicates the relevance of institutional rules
and would gain from being connected to new institutional approaches
in social sciences. Secondly, media governance may be seen as an instru-
ment of media regulation. Governmental actors or regulatory authorities
set rules or may commit other actors to negotiate rules.
With this connection to institutional thinking, media governance can
be a possible and fruitful theoretical bridge between several scientific
disciplines, and theoretical paradigms. With its theoretical foundation in
rules, institutions, and relationships between actors, the approach con-
nects with several disciplines like sociology, political science, economics,
or law. As a more practical approach in media regulation, media gover-
nance bridges the experiences made within different regulatory cultures,
particularly the Anglo-Saxon tradition and the Central-European.
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Media Governance as a horizontal extension
of Media Regulation:
The importance of Self- and Co-Regulation
MANUEL PUPPIS
From media regulation to media governance
A media governance perspective not only underlines the relevance of
non-statutory regulation but also questions the role of the state. This
paper first discusses governance as a horizontal extension of government
covering statutory regulation as well as self- and co-regulation. Second,
potentials and risks of these forms of governance are dealt with. Third,
different domains of media governance will be distinguished before look-
ing into the varying role of private actors and the state in them. Due to
the fact that media are not seen as just another commodity but as play-
ing a crucial political, social, and cultural role for society, media regula-
tion is predominantly a matter of the nation state. However, what ex-
actly is regulation?
Broadly, statutory regulation means that the state formulates and en-
forces rules and sanctions non-compliance with these rules. Or, as Bal-
dwin and Cave (1999: 2) put it, statutory regulation refers to a “deliber-
ate state influence” and “covers all state actions designed to influence
industrial or social behavior” (i. e. command-based regimes, economic
incentives, and the supply of information). Statutory media regulation
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then means the regulation of the media. Mass media, for their part, stand
for the “organized means of communicating” whereas the “process of
mass communication and the actual media that make it possible” can
be distinguished (McQuail, 2005: 4, 24). Accordingly, statutory media
regulation can be defined as the formulation and enforcement of rules
as well as the sanctioning of non-compliance regarding media organiza-
tions and the processes of mass communication they are organizing.
Statutory regulation is partly implemented by so-called regulatory agen-
cies which operate on the basis of a legislative mandate (Majone,
1996a: 9).
However, there are other possibilities of regulation. These days we
observe a shift from statutory media regulation (or government) to me-
dia governance. On the one hand, the influence of European and global
regulation is increasing. On the other hand, forms of regulation where
private actors are involved (self- and co-regulation) are becoming more
important (Puppis and Künzler, 2007). The concept of media governance
encompasses both developments and stands for a horizontal as well as a
vertical extension of government (see Figure 1). As Mayntz (2004: 66)
has pointed out, governance can be understood as the regulatory struc-
ture as a whole, combining public and private, hierarchical and network
forms of action coordination.
Figure 1. Media governance as horizontal and vertical extension of government.
Source: Puppis (2007: 62)
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 08.12.17 16:31
332 The importance of Self- and Co-Regulation
Regarding the horizontal extension of government, the term ‘media
governance’ covers statutory media regulation as well as self- and co-
regulation in the media. While the state is not involved in self-regulatory
organizations (apart from supposable pressure on the industry), co-regu-
lation is taking place within a framework provided by the state and
refers to a mix of statutory regulation and self-regulation (Jarren et al.,
2002; Latzer, 2002; Schulz and Held, 2004):
• Self-regulation describes forms of regulation where private actors for-
mulate and enforce rules and sanction non-compliance directed
towards their own industry.
• Co-Regulation refers to the formulation and enforcement of rules and
the sanctioning of non-compliance by private actors who are man-
dated to do so and who work together with the state (mostly regula-
tory agencies). This means that self-regulation is taking place within a
framework provided by the state. The term ‘regulated self-regulation’,
which is often used in the German-language literature as a synonym
for co-regulation, seems quiet fitting to describe this arrangement.
Potentials and risks of non-statutory regulation
Politicians and media companies alike often argue that statutory media
regulation alone is not sufficient, and that ‘new’ forms of regulation are
needed. The participation of private actors in broadcasting regulation is
seen as both a possibility of re-regulation and a solution for the dilemma
how to reconcile media freedom and media regulation.
First, statutory media regulation encounters several difficulties caus-
ing a need for re-regulation. Not only did traditional regulation by the
state come under pressure due to ideological changes and economic in-
terests, its shortcomings in consequence of technical changes and com-
mercialization became apparent as well (Dyson and Humphreys, 1989).
The introduction of private broadcasting in Western European countries
(‘dualization’), the globalization of the media industry as well as the
digitization and convergence of media technology cast doubt that the
state alone can effectively regulate the media. Additionally, statutory
media regulation has problems to cope in the new media field. It is
believed that the participation of private actors through self- and co-
regulation will avoid these problems. A number of advantages are often
associated with self-regulatory organizations: They are said to be more
flexible, faster, more cost-effective and to have more expertise than regu-
latory agencies (Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Majone, 1996a: 23; Ogus,
2000).
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However, statutory media regulation raises a second problem which
is an even more important rationale for self- and co-regulation. Media
regulation is always between a rock and a hard place. While there are
legitimate societal, economic, and technical justifications for media regu-
lation, in democratic societies the media should be devoid of governmen-
tal influence. Accordingly, media freedom restricts the scope of media
regulation. Non-statutory media regulation may be a solution for this
dilemma of media regulation: media freedom is respected because the
media regulate themselves.
Despite the potential of self- and co-regulation there are also risks to
keep in mind (Baldwin/Cave, 1999; Majone, 1996a; Ogus, 2000). First,
self-regulation is mostly introduced to keep the state off from regulation
and not because the industry has secret desires for more rules. Second,
self-regulation may conduce to the realization of private interests rather
than the public interest. “With self-regulation, regulatory capture is there
from the outset” (Kay quoted in Ogus, 1994: 108). Third, self-regulation
lacks democratic legitimacy. Most importantly, however, it is question-
able if self-regulation is really compulsory enough. There exists no guar-
antee that self-imposed rules will indeed be enforced and that non-com-
pliance will be sanctioned. These problems raise the question of whether
the state should be involved in self-regulation. For instance, Majone
(1996a: 26) argues that “the presence of a forceful public regulator is
needed in order to ‘guard the guardians’”. This brings us back to media
governance. A governance perspective on regulation not only highlights
the importance of non-statutory regulation but also the choice between
different forms of regulation, “regulatory choice”, as Schuppert (2005:
395) termed it, and the role of the state in self-regulation.
Domains of media governance
Given the aspects above, we ask ourselves: Which form of regulation is
the right choice? And should the state be involved in self-regulation? It
is impossible to provide answers that are valid for the media sector as a
whole. Rather we have to acknowledge that the role of private actors
and the state varies. Therefore, it is suggested to distinguish between
different domains of media governance: The regulation of organizations,
of ownership, of funding, of distribution, of processes and of content.
• Organizations: In many countries public service broadcasters were in-
stitutionalized. Furthermore, private broadcasters require a license
from the state.
• Ownership: By means of ownership restrictions it is the aim to curb
media concentration and cross-ownership in order to preserve diver-
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sity. Regulation of media ownership and concentration can go beyond
the general competition law applicable to all sectors of economy. For
instance, it is possible to restrict the permitted viewer market share of
any single company or to limit the number of licenses a company
may obtain.
• Funding: Public service broadcasters are at least to some extent funded
by public money. Subsidies for the media industry (i. e. for the press
and for audio-visual production) are common as well. Additionally,
advertising restrictions exist in broadcasting.
• Distribution: Digitization poses a challenge for the electronic com-
munications infrastructure and creates new bottlenecks. The compa-
nies who own the infrastructure required to reach their audience can
act as gatekeepers. They have the power to decide who gets access to
their network and their facilities (e. g., Conditional Access System,
Application Programming Interface, Electronic Program Guide).
• Processes: The process of creating editorial content, for instance jour-
nalistic work processes, is another domain of media governance.
• Content: While content requirements refer to broad principles like
objectivity, impartiality, or diversity as well as quotas for national and
European content, content restrictions impose limits on the dissemi-
nation of certain types of content (Bernier, 2004: 216 f.).
Which form of regulation is the right choice? It is suggested that self- and
co-regulation do not occur in all these domains of media governance. In
some of them, statutory media regulation prevails (e. g., in ownership
regulation there are no private actors involved for good reasons). Non-
statutory forms of regulation are especially relevant in the regulation of
organizations, of distribution, of processes, and of content. In the regula-
tion of organizations, the board of public service broadcasters is mostly
responsible for the self-regulation of these organizations (e. g., setting
internal guidelines). In the regulation of distribution, self-regulatory or-
ganizations are often concerned with technical standardization or the
management of internet core resources. In the regulation of processes, no
statutory regulation exists. Horizontal extension of government means
that a self-regulatory organization is enforcing rules for journalistic work
processes and the presentation of information. In many countries, press
councils are not only responsible for printed media but also for broad-
casting and the Internet. In the regulation of content, horizontal exten-
sion of government means that a self-regulatory organization is con-
cerned with content restrictions. The aim is to prevent or to restrict the
dissemination of content that is perceived to be inappropriate for minors
(e. g., representation of sex and violence). Examples are the Australian
system of content regulation or the German ‘Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle
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Fernsehen’ (voluntary self-regulation of television). The latter inspects
fictional programming before dissemination and decides on transmission
time and necessary cuts.
Should the state be involved in self-regulation? Based on results of com-
parative research projects (Jarren et al., 2002; Puppis et al., 2004; see
Matthias Künzler in this section for more details) it is assumed that the
role of the state in media governance varies across these domains. In-
stead of no state at all, co-regulation is often preferred to self-regulation.
By bringing the state back in, the aim is to tap the potentials of non-
statutory regulation while at the same time preventing its risks. The
question regarding the role of the state in self-regulation in different
domains of media governance is highly relevant as it is connected to the
bindingness and the legitimacy of governance. First, questions surround-
ing the effectiveness of self-regulation (‘regulatory impact assessment’)
come to the fore. Second, it can be doubted that self-regulation results
in democratically legitimated regulation in the public interest. With co-
regulation, however, an obligation to be accountable and transparent
can foster procedural legitimacy (Majone, 1996b: 291 f.). In the end,
there is no easy answer. Whether media governance by private actors
should involve government or not, depends on the domain of gover-
nance, the type of media in question as well as national structures and
traditions.
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Media Concentration and Media Governance
WERNER A. MEIER and IRENE PERRIN
Concentration of political and economic power
Media concentration is a concentration of economic and societal power.
It poses a fundamental problem for democracies. Since market-leading
media companies have no incentive to prevent concentration, as concen-
tration strengthens a company’s competitive position and prevents po-
tential competitors from entering the market, a multitude of small inde-
pendent media companies have merged into a small number of big me-
dia companies.
National oligopolies and regional monopolies are becoming common,
although both types of market structure contradict the existing economic
order. However, they prevail because dominant players defend their priv-
ileges. Media tycoon Rupert Murdoch points out this contradiction by
objecting to competitors’ monopolies, while defending his own: “Mo-
nopolies are terrible things … until you have one” (Financial Times,
November 13, 2004). Media concentration provides media companies
with exclusive access to the public, which means that media companies
can count on preferential treatment in politics (cf. Barnett, 2004). Thus,
media policy is increasingly controlled by corporate media which are
able to influence the regulatory framework and state measures in the
media sector (cf. Schäfer, 1999). As public discourse mostly takes place
in the media, the potential of negative consequences for democracy such
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 08.12.17 16:31
Werner A. Meier and Irene Perrin 337
as less democratic pluralism, less political and cultural diversity, and
increasing power for some privileged social actors, is generally played
down or ignored. The general failure to fight media concentration effec-
tively is not surprising, considering the low visibility of the media con-
centration debate. A majority of European countries have passed compe-
tition legislation and media concentration laws. However, these laws
have proven to be unable to prevent ownership concentration in media.
In media policy practice, the focus of regulation is on ensuring economic
competition. Legislation rather aims at making local media industries
more competitive on international markets than at securing media qual-
ity and diversity. Obviously, economic interests prevail over societal or
democratic interests.
Media governance on the way to democratic governance?
The proposed concept of media governance deals with the complex rela-
tionships of political, economic, and mass media power structures. It
analyzes and evaluates existing power structures and their effects on all
stakeholders involved. Media governance should be able to grasp com-
plex power structures within media organizations and between media
organizations and other institutions on both a theoretical and a practical
level (cf. Picard, 2005). The governance of the media “(…) covers all
means by which the mass media are limited, directed, encouraged, man-
aged, or called into account, ranging from the most binding law to the
most resistible of pressures and self-chosen disciplines” (McQuail, 2003:
91).
A certain degree of tension between constitutional media freedom and
media responsibility for democracy is inherent in all forms of media
governance. Denis McQuail has coined an apt expression for this ten-
sion. He called it “controlling free media” (McQuail, 2003: 91).The gov-
ernment is unable to secure quality and performance of media, but it
can formulate laws and regulations which safeguard these objectives.
The creation of multimedia companies and the investment of private
equity in media result in an increasing commercialization of content.
They make it more difficult to balance corporate, professional, journalis-
tic, and societal interests with institutional and individual shareholders’
interests. Ultimately, media governance is supposed to mediate rising
conflicts of interest by creating a platform which empowers previously
neglected stakeholders, mainly civil society, and at the same time encour-
age the state and media organizations to assume their obligations to
society. Thus, media governance paves the way for democratization of
media and society by asking whose interests dominate media companies,
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to whose end they operate, and by integrating the ‘neglected’ interests
into the media organization.
Thus, the concept of media governance is conceptualized as a multi-
stakeholder approach which is supposed to ‘tackle’ complex conflicts of
interest in media policy. The stakeholder approach takes into account
different stakeholders’ interests within corporate actions (cf. Freeman,
1984; Post, Preston et al., 2002). Companies tend to accommodate stake-
holders which are vital to their success, such as shareholders, employees,
suppliers, and customers, but neglect stakeholders with little or no power
but which nonetheless have justified claims and expectations (cf. Mitch-
ell, Agle et al., 1997).
As media governance is based on a systematic, comprehensive, and
institutionalized multi-stakeholder approach it is able to integrate (ne-
glected) stakeholder interests on various levels. Civil society, which so
far only appeared in the role of the audience, is participating in media
governance processes alongside established stakeholders such as media
organizations, economic interests, and state authorities. Companies are
no longer acting only in corporate interest but also in society’s. And
corporate performance is judged from various perspectives (cf. Post,
Preston et al., 2002: 17).
Media companies are not only accountable to employees, advertising
clients, consumers, and investors but also to other stakeholders such as
the public, the community where they are based, and to political and
cultural institutions which rely on media performance. To accommodate
these contradictions and conflicts in theory and in practice, two types
(public and corporate governance) containing five forms of media gover-
nance are suggested.
Firstly, these five forms of media governance are supposed to offer a
sufficiently sophisticated tool for analysis to look into the conflicts asso-
ciated with media concentration. Secondly, a media policy concept (soft
governance) is to be developed to complement state measures. Thirdly,
a discursive and interactive platform is to be created, where power asser-
tion and claims of power can be judged on their legitimacy. These five
forms can be divided into two types, namely public governance of media,
and media corporate governance.
Type A: Public governance of media includes all measures which ensure
that media serve the public interest and civil society. State media policy
is at the centre of public governance. State governance (1) of media fo-
cuses on the general framework for media, brought in by the state and
society, in form of media, competition and anti-trust law.
Type B: Media corporate governance concepts are known under the terms
‘good corporate governance’, ‘good corporate citizenship’, or ‘corporate
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social responsibility’. External corporate media governance (2) includes
corporate rules concerning conduct of the management in relation to
newsrooms and to civil society. Ownership governance (3) includes mis-
sion statements of media organizations aiming at a socially responsible
and sustainable media order. Private media however are usually not an-
swerable to the public, only to shareholders and owners. Internal corpo-
rate media governance (4) focuses on power structures within organiza-
tions, for example relation of power between management, board and
investors or shareholders, and on management’s influence on the news
production process. In the literature, the latter type is called ‘news gover-
nance’ within media organizations (cf. Arrese, 2005). The fifth form of
media governance records the contribution and efforts of media to pro-
mote democracy. Governance by media coverage (5) focuses on the contri-
bution of media content to a democratic society. The idea is to measure
media’s functioning as a public watchdog of the state and the economy.
Media governance: Application to forms and consequences of
concentration
The first practical test of the approach suggested consists of an attempt
to formulate a concept of governance adequate to the forms and conse-
quences of media concentration. In the following, the concept is put
up for discussion (see table 1), and some of the proposed governance
mechanisms are presented.
Concentration and the strengthening of a dominant position increase
the probability of abuse. Therefore, accountability and transparency
guidelines are desirable. Tougher rules for ownership transparency
(shareholders, interests of management, corporate integration) are as im-
portant as quality assurance measures (in-house journalism criticisms).
As is common in other sectors, these efforts and measures are to be
published in an annual Corporate Governance Report.
OECD has published transparency guidelines which can be applied to
media companies (cf. OECD, 2004; 2005). In addition, leading media
companies are supposed to ensure the transparency of the separation
between newsroom and management. A noteworthy example is the
Washington Post: “The newspaper’s duty is to its readers and to the
public at large, and not to the private interests of the owner” (Final
Report on the Canadian News Media 2006: 132). Media companies are
obliged to make sure their coverage of media includes causes, forms,
and consequences of media concentration and political efforts to prevent
concentration. It has to be said, though, that media journalism soon
reaches a limit (cf. Fengler/Russ-Mohl, 2006).
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In addition, an independent media observatory could be discussed, as
well as the institution of Public Editors or ombudsmen and a publication
of corporate and newsroom accountability reports alongside internal
guidelines. These measures would encourage investigative reporting.
The media observatory has been described elsewhere in detail (cf. Jar-
ren et al., 2002). The observatory as a competence centre is supposed to
provide reliable and up-to-date data on media concentration for use in
public discourse and to point out emerging problems. A media observa-
tory aims at recording forms of media concentration which are so far
not on the radar of media policy.
Corporate ombudsmen are appointed and instructed by the media
themselves. They serve as contact points for societal stakeholders who
are not adequately represented in certain media. In this way, ombudsmen
offer a platform of mediation between interests of the public and inter-
ests of the media (management and newsroom). The complaints lodged
against a company are collected by the ombudsman and published in an
appropriate form in regular intervals. The Public Editor has to be pro-
vided with his or her own editorial space or a platform to publish correc-
tions of, and further thoughts on contributions which were objected to.
Media companies have started to publish corporate governance state-
ments because of rising pressure from shareholders and politicians. This
applies to private media companies as well as Public Service organiza-
tions. Corporate governance, however, fails to allow for media-specific
characteristics. For example, media concentration rules should be added.
A governance statement should include reports about the status quo and
progress in introducing editorial guidelines, newsroom charters, and the
separation of newsroom and management. It should also describe a com-
pany’s efforts to secure editorial autonomy within a larger media con-
glomerate. Editorial representatives and management would have to
take a stand.
The governance report could be presented in a public hearing, which
representatives of different stakeholders such as civil society, politics,
and media companies would attend. These events would serve to articu-
late and negotiate expectations in structured dialogues, chaired each time
by a different stakeholder.
Editorial charters and corporate guidelines are fundamental to many
media organizations’ business. They focus on quality assurance, editorial
autonomy, and diversity. To prevent negative consequences of media
concentration, media are obliged to secure editorial autonomy from ad-
vertising clients, the advertising department, and the management. A
charter of separation deals with the relationship between shareholders,
management board, and the editorial department (such as the right of
shareholders and editorial board to interfere with editorial and staff deci-
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sions, etc.). Such a charter is particularly relevant in diagonally inte-
grated companies. The charter of separation also includes rules for the
budgeting process negotiated among different departments.
Conclusion
Traditional media and concentration politics can be seen as the sum of
all measures and instruments within the framework of legislation which
regulate concentration in the media sector. They have so far been ineffec-
tive when applied to big media companies. Efforts have not proven to
be successful neither on the national nor on the international level, with
some exceptions such as the failed takeover of Pro Sieben Sat.1 by Axel
Springer in spring 2006. If the economic imperative continues to assert
itself over editorial and diversity objectives, additional instruments like
those recommended in our Media Governance approach should be con-
sidered and be evaluated.
In order to take different stakeholders’ interests into account and to
implement a multi-stakeholder approach, it is crucial to create new insti-
tutions, processes, and systems which include both societal and eco-
nomic interests and report on the performance in both areas. New insti-
tutions are necessary because traditional reporting mainly focuses on
shareholders’ interests. However, a media governance approach which
takes into account a multi-stakeholder perspective is difficult to imple-
ment, but in the end it helps to legitimize media companies’ editorial
and corporate actions in society. Increasing media power and influence
of media demands balancing counterchecks: “There seems to be a grow-
ing consensus that increasing ‘power’ or, better, ‘influence’ of the media
has to be counterbalanced by greater media transparency and account-
ability” (Bardoel and d’Haenens, 2004: 10).
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Regulatory choices in Communication Governance
MICHAEL LATZER
Governance as modified research perspective
The growing use of governance concepts in the communication field in-
dicates a modified research perspective that stresses the importance of
institutions in communication policy research, and extends the tradi-
tional focus on national government in two directions:
(1) Horizontally, it includes the role of private actors in regulation, the
remix of state, and private contributions in communications regula-
tion;
(2) Vertically, it incorporates the multi-level character of regulation, the
interplay of national regulation with international, supranational,
regional, and local regulation.
Both extensions are important in order to assess recent changes in com-
munication regulation triggered by liberalization and globalization, to
grasp the changing and diminishing role of nation states, and to advise
policy makers on their regulatory choices between different modes of
regulation in convergent markets.
This paper focuses on the regulatory part of governance, defined as
intentional constraints on market players. Further, it centers on the
growing horizontal extension of government in communications, which
is indicated by the increasing incidence of self- and co-regulation, sum-
marized in this paper as alternative modes of regulation1. These less
formalized means of regulation are not new phenomena in communica-
tions regulation. However, empirical research shows that there is a grow-
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ing reliance on such alternative forms of regulation, which are carried
out partly, or even entirely, by private regulatory institutions (see Latzer,
Just, Saurwein, and Slominsky, 2006; PCMLP, 2004; Schulz and Held,
2004). They are gaining importance at all levels of multi-level governance
regimes, and their application is encouraged by political institutions, for
instance by the European Commission (see COM, 2001: 428; COM,
2002: 278). Early applications of self- and co-regulation in the communi-
cations sector have been predominantly in technical areas and in media-
content regulation. The greatest reliance on the latter form of regulation
within the communications sector can be found in the regulation of print
media (see Suhr, 1998; Nordenstreng, 1999), whereas in telecommunica-
tions and broadcasting there has always been a stronger reliance on the
statutory legal basis and state actors. However, a sharp increase in self-
regulation occurred in the 1990s, triggered by the Internet boom. Many
single-issue institutions have been founded that are mainly active in ex-
post enforcement measures and in rule making. They usually intervene
after problems have occurred and lack strict powers of sanction (see
Latzer, Just, Saurwein and Slominsky, 2006).
Regulatory choice as institutional choice
Growing reliance on alternative modes of regulation not only raises the
question of why alternative regulation is introduced, but also on how to
decide on the adequate mix of state and alternative regulation from a
public-policy perspective.
Regarding the first question, two ideal-type explanations can be distin-
guished: Private actors are involved in public regulation as makeshift
solution or as ideal solution to regulatory problems. It is a makeshift
solution if traditional state regulation fails, for example in the case of
transborder regulatory problems, when political actors do not have
much option but to apply alternative modes of regulation. Otherwise, if
nation states have an effective choice between different regulatory forms,
self- and co-regulation may be chosen as an ideal solution. The reasons
are the expected advantages over state regulation from a public-policy
point of view, for example better know-how within the industry, reduced
regulatory cost, faster decisions, and more flexible solutions2. Alongside
these incentives from a public-policy perspective, the major incentive
from an industry point of view for a voluntary introduction of self-
regulation is to pre-empt state regulation. Accordingly, self-regulation is
rather introduced and effectively enforced in areas where governments
have the potential to impose state regulation. In other words, ‘carrot
and stick’ strategies will work if the public stick capacity is high, if gov-
ernments can convincingly ‘threaten’ to use ‘big guns’ (command-and-
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control regulations) if the industry does not solve regulatory problems
by means of self-regulation (see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 19 ff.).
From a public-policy point of view, self- and co-regulation cannot
completely replace traditional state intervention. Nevertheless, alterna-
tive modes of regulation may be an effective way to complement state
regulation. State intervention might only be needed as a temporary and
supplementary remedial action (see Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999).
The effectiveness and efficiency of regulation depends to a large extent
on the interplay between the different forms of regulation on the contin-
uum between state and market.
The question of how to find an adequate mix can be conceptualized
as part of a multistage regulatory choice process. The plurality of public
and private norm-setting actors and a plurality of norms, ranging from
classical command-and-control-regulations (laws) to various forms of
‘soft law’ and voluntary agreements, are preconditions for regulatory
choice (see Schuppert, 2005: 398). The institutional choices regarding the
adequate regulatory arrangement cannot be applied across the board for
the whole communications sector, but need to be applied on a case-by-
case basis for any specific regulatory problem. A rough guideline for
the systematic search for a suitable regulatory institutional arrangement,
which builds on theoretical reasoning and experiences with various
modes of regulation, is summarized in Figure 1. It is structured by con-
secutive questions, which are to be discussed in order to choose the regu-
latory arrangements. Policy makers may use it either for ex-ante assess-
ments of regulatory problems at issue, or for ex-post evaluations of al-
ready existing policy solutions. Because the primary interest of this
analysis is in the changing role of the state, the guideline centers on
choices regarding the institutional dimension of regulatory mechanisms,
which shows by whom (actors) and how (processes) regulation is carried
out, and not on the substantive dimension, which asks what is being
regulated (e. g., access, prices)3.
As a first step, it is to be decided whether market intervention is
deemed necessary at all. A list of regulatory objectives of communica-
tions policy, including both cultural and economic goals, makes it pos-
sible to systematically discuss the need for market intervention4. Regula-
tion theories, in particular normative theories of regulation, prove help-
ful in this respect.
After the identification of the guiding objectives and the decision on
the necessity of market intervention, it has to be clarified whether there
is a capacity to act, that is, if the state is in a position to choose between
different regulatory forms. The state’s ability to choose between regula-
tory mechanisms could be high on national level but low on the interna-
tional level, and it could be high in norm setting but low in sanctioning.
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What regulatory objectives are at stake?
Are market interventions necessary to achieve these objectives?
• Cultural and economic objectives
• Theories of regulation
 If interventions are deemed necessary
How high is the state’s capacity to act – the ability to choose between modes
of regulation?
Two dimensions to be discussed:
• Within the various levels of a multi-level-governance regime
• Within the regulatory process (norm-setting, ex-ante/ex-post enforcement, sanc-
tioning)

How big is the need for state intervention?
How appropriate are alternative modes of regulation?
Criteria to be discussed:
• Risk of regulatory failure
• Required intensity of regulatory intervention
• Conflicts between public and private interests
• Differences in market power of the companies involved
• Reputation-sensitivity of the industry to regulation
• Recognized organization that could take over the regulatory task
 If self- or co-regulation is chosen
How are alternative modes of regulation instituted?
Success factors to be discussed:
• Operational objectives and clearly defined responsibilities
• Transparent regulatory processes and measurable results
• Defined fall-back scenarios in case of malfunctioning
• Adequate sanction powers
• Periodical reviews and external control by the general public and the state
• Participation possibilities for interested stakeholders
Figure 1. Regulatory choices as institutional choices – a guideline for its systematic dis-
cussion.
Hence, the question of the state’s options regarding modes of regulation
should be discussed systematically on two dimensions: for the various
levels of the multi-level governance regime and for the regulatory process,
that is, for norm setting, ex-ante/ex-post enforcement and sanctioning.
If the opportunities for state intervention are low, there might be no
other choice (makeshift solution) but to rely on self-regulation and on
private actors. Even in this case, the state has some remaining options
to control the development. For example, it could initiate and promote
alternative regulations and it could take part in self-regulation, either
with financial or personal contributions. Otherwise, if the regulatory op-
tions are high, then a rational choice (ideal solution) could be made re-
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garding the extent of alternative regulation, which uses the potential
benefits from its advantages over state regulation as listed above, and
avoids possible disadvantages of alternative regulations, for example a
symbolic policy with weak standards, ineffective enforcement and mild
sanctions, regulatory capture, and insufficient democratic quality.
The appropriateness of alternative modes of regulation from a public-
policy perspective can be discussed based on a list of criteria deduced
from theoretical and empirical research. Alternative regulation may be
appropriate or the necessity for state involvement may be low:
 if the risk of regulatory failure is low;
 if only a low intensity of regulatory intervention is required;
 if there are no strong conflicts between public and private interests;
 if there are no strong differences in market power of the companies
involved;
 if the reputation-sensitivity of the regulation to the industry is high;
 if there is an already recognized organization that could take over the
regulatory task.
Some examples illustrate the application of the criteria listed5. Risks of
regulatory failure are high, for instance, if it results in detrimental effects
on the functioning of the infrastructure, or if it entails high economic
cost, as in the case of spam mail. For the regulation of market transpar-
ency, the risk of failure is rather low. The intensity of regulatory interven-
tion can be considered as high if there are existential effects on market
players involved, as in the example of interconnection regulations. For
market transparency measures it can be assessed as low. The reputation-
sensitivity to regulations can be evaluated by taking a look at the effects
of non-compliance with these regulations. If the non-compliance to a
regulation (e. g., regarding consumer protection) results in a loss of repu-
tation and consequently in falling sales figures, then the reputation-sensi-
tivity can be considered to be high.
Regarding the applicability of this checklist, it should be kept in mind
that it will not always be possible to deal with all criteria, and sometimes
an assessment may lead to contradictory results regarding the choice of
regulatory mechanisms. In the case of spam, for example, the risk of
regulatory failure is high and at the same time the market is charac-
terized by high reputation-sensitivity. While the former indicates the
need for stronger state involvement, the latter indicates the appropriate-
ness of self- and co-regulation. Hence, a balanced mix of state and alter-
native modes of regulation might be the result of an evaluation that also
takes into account the interplay between criteria and the degree of inten-
sity of each particular criterion.
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After the decision on the use of alternative modes of regulation, some
choices remain to be made regarding their institutional specifics. From
a public interest perspective, there are several success factors to be as-
sessed (see Campbell, 1999). For example, defined fallback-scenarios in
the case of malfunctioning, transparent regulatory processes, periodic
reviews, options for stakeholder participation, and adequate sanctions.
Concluding remarks
This paper centered on regulatory choices as institutional choices. It
took full account of the changed research perspective of governance and
recent developments in the convergent communications sector, for exam-
ple the growing reliance on self- and co-regulation. Various theoretical
and empirical research results on communications governance, in par-
ticular on different modes of state and alternative regulation, were bun-
dled in a rough guideline, which is intended to assist policy-makers either
in ex-ante assessments of upcoming regulatory problems or in the ex-
post evaluation of policy choices regarding the institutional regulatory
arrangements. It goes without saying that any specific regulatory choice
in the end remains a political decision, that there are no one-size-fits-all
solutions, and that the guideline is not a technocratic formula that can
mechanically be applied. Further empirical and comparative research
will make it possible to gradually refine the guideline, thus contributing
to strengthening the link between communication policy research and
policymaking, often being criticized as too weak.
Notes
1. The paper builds on Latzer, Just, Saurwein and Slominsky (2002, 2003, 2006); Just,
Latzer and Saurwein (2007).
2. For potential advantages and disadvantages see Boddewyn (1988); Ayres and
Braithwaite (1992); Ogus (1995); Campbell (1999); NCC (2000).
3. For an analysis of regulatory choice that centers on the substantive dimension, see
Schuppert (2006: 395 ff.).
4. For a structured overview of regulatory goals in the convergent communications
sector, see Latzer, Just, Saurwein and Slominski (2002: 105).
5. For a systematic application of this check list on selected regulatory topics (in-
terconnection, market transparency, spam) see Latzer, Just, Saurwein, and Slomin-
ski (2002: 152 ff.); Just, Latzer, and Saurwein (2007).
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The state as a key success factor
for Self-Regulation? Empirical evidence in brief
MATTHIAS KÜNZLER
Introduction
The necessity of the state’s involvement in self-regulation is a controver-
sial issue in the debate about Governance. As Puppis (earlier in this
section) mentioned, the role of the state varies across the six domains of
media governance, but there are hardly any empirical studies about the
question whether a state’s involvement is a key success factor for self-
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regulation. By focusing on three domains of media regulation, namely
processes, content, and organizations, some answers will be formulated.
What follows is a secondary analysis of two empirical studies, compar-
ing forms of self- and co-regulation in the broadcasting sector in dif-
ferent western states (Jarren et al., 2002; Puppis et al., 2004). The cases
were selected so as to include as broad a spectrum of different forms of
self-regulation (SR) and co-regulation (CR) as possible. Document
analysis and expert interviews were chosen as research methods. The
advantages of these two qualitative methods are their openness and flexi-
bility, which allow discovering new aspects not taken into consideration
in existing theories, the possibility to take into account a small number
of cases, and their ability to make a step in the direction of theory-
building (Deacon et al., 1999). The interviewees were professionals from
self-regulatory organizations, broadcasting companies, and representa-
tives from regulatory agencies, ministries and researchers. Laws, codes
of practice, and secondary literature about the organizations under study
were analyzed. The case studies were updated by the author in 2006. The
following presentation of some of the research results is conducted by
comparing four dimensions of forms of co- and self-regulation: The
types of media co- and self-regulation are responsible for, the role of the
state, the rationales for implementing these forms of governance, and
the assessment of self- and co-regulation by the interviewees.
Content regulation
In the domain of content regulation, co-regulation is the most frequent
form (see Table 1).
In all cases, co-regulation was introduced for three main reasons. To
ensure the media’s independence from the state, to be able to review
fictional programming before dissemination, and to adjust regulation
flexibly to societal change. As an additional reason for introducing co-
regulation, a shift in the political paradigm in the direction of the state’s
withdrawal was raised in Canada and New Zealand. Co- and self-regula-
tion are thought to better suit the new paradigm.
Non-statutory regulation is assessed in an ambivalent way by the ex-
perts interviewed. The enforcement of rules and the sanctioning of non-
compliance are said to operate effectively in the cases of co-regulation.
However, this aspect is criticized in the case of self-regulation. This also
seems to be the reason for substituting a self-regulation code by co-
regulation in Italy. Also negatively assessed is the aspect that non-statu-
tory content regulation through self- or co-regulation is only based on
complaints and that no positive content requirements can be established.
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Table 1. Self- and co-regulatory mechanisms in five countries.
Country Description SR/CR responsibility
Australia Broadcasters associations develop CR Broadcasting
codes of practices which have to be and internet
accredited by the regulator (ACMA).
The ACMA monitors the compliance
with complaint handling. In case of
multiple breaches it can tighten
broadcaster’s license or implement new
regulations.
New Zealand The regulator (BSA) can develop codes CR Broadcasting
of practice itself or delegate it to the
industry. The codes developed by the
sector must be accredited and
overviewed every five years by BSA.
Canada The private broadcasters established a SR (in Broadcasting
self-regulation organization (CBSC) part)
which developed Codes of practice.
CBSC committed to maintain certain
demands of the regulation authority
(CRTC), whereas CRTC included parts
of CBSC’s codes into the license of
some private broadcasters.
Germany Private broadcasting TV stations CR Broadcasting
founded the self-regulation
organization FSF. Its mission is to
review fictional programming for the
protection of minors. A commission
of the regulation authorities supervises
the norms defining the protection of
minors and accredited the FSF.
Italy Two self-regulation organizations SR and Broadcasting
concerning TV for minors exist CR
(Comitato dei Attazione del Codice dei
Regolamentazione Convenzionale TV
e Minori, Comitato dei Controlle TV
e Minori). Since 2002 the first one is a
form of co-regulation.
Note: Own description, source: ACMA (2006), BSA (2006), Comitato (2005), FSF
(2006), media laws, expert interviews.
Regulation of processes
Process regulation deals with the establishment of rules for journalistic
work processes within media organizations, and for the ways in which
information is presented. This kind of regulation is done through devel-
oping (ethical) codes of practice for journalistic work and for the presen-
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tation of information, and through the implementation of sanctions in
case the code is breached. In most European countries, Press or Media
Councils are responsible for this industry-wide. In the case of an as-
sumed code-breach, readers or viewers can file a complaint. It is also
possible that a single media organization regulates the processes only for
its own organization, something which is normally done by public ser-
vice broadcasters (for this aspect see Schade and Künzler, 2006). Press
and media councils are self-regulated in all cases with the exception of
Denmark, and they are often not only responsible for the press but also
for radio, television, and the contents distributed on the Internet (Sonni-
nen and Laitila, 1995; Appelquist-Schmidlechner, 2001).
In our research project, we took a detailed look at media councils in
Denmark (Pressenævnet), Sweden (Pressens Opinionsnämnd) and Fin-
land (Julkisen Sanan Neuvosto). They are interesting cases because Nor-
dic states have a long tradition in media councils, and because the cases
of Denmark and Sweden are different from most other countries. In
Denmark, the state established the Danish press council by law (Media
Liability Act) in 1992 and some of the Council’s members are appointed
by the Ministry of Justice. This form was not found in any other country.
Another special form of Press Council exists in Sweden. Complaints
must first be filed to a Press Ombudsman (Allmänhetens Pressombuds-
man) which then decides if a complaint will be referred to the Press
Council.
Three main rationales for introducing self-regulation are given by all
interviewees. Firstly, the threat of statutory regulation and the industry’s
will to prevent this. (In Denmark the industry failed to achieve this, since
the different private actors were not able to agree on founding a council.)
Secondly, the assumption that self-regulation could include higher prac-
tical relevance. Finally, press councils are dealing with media ethics; a
matter which is difficult to cover by law.
Overall, press and media councils are assessed positively in the cases
examined. Especially the media’s independence from the state and the
acceptance by the regulated industry are looked upon favorably by the
interviewees. However, the possibility of sanctioning non-compliance is
assessed controversially. Normally, media councils can enforce the publi-
cation of a reprehension. While the majority of the interviewees assesses
this measure as sufficient, some wish for additional sanctioning, for ex-
ample monetary fines.
Regulation of organizations
In the domain of regulating organizations, forms of non-statutory regu-
lation are prevailing for the regulation of public service broadcasting.
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An internal board is not only responsible for an organization’s compli-
ance with regulations, but also for the internal formulation and enforce-
ment of rules, and sanctioning of its non-compliance. The cases of or-
ganizational regulation examined are the BBC Board of Governors
(UK) (called BBC Trust as of 2007), RTE´ Authority (Ireland), ORF-
Stiftungsrat (Austria), and the Rundfunkräte of the ARD-members
SWR, WDR, MDR (Germany). In each of these cases the state partici-
pates in different ways. On the one hand, law delegates responsibility to
these boards for monitoring compliance with statutory regulations, for
handling program complaints, and for ensuring to maintain quality stan-
dards (e. g., through setting internal guidelines). On the other hand, the
members of the board are partly appointed by governmental bodies or
their formation is regulated by law (especially Germany and Austria
regulate in detail which societal groups need to be incorporated). At
the same time, the boards are not only responsible for regulating the
organization but also for strategic decisions. Because of the state’s in-
volvement, these boards are co-regulated, but since regulation is desig-
nated to a single media organization and not to a self-regulation organi-
zation which is responsible for the whole industry, it can be named ‘en-
forced self-regulation’ (Ayre and Braithwaite, 1992).
Hence, the main rationale for implementing co-regulation through an
internal board is seen in the public service’s independence from the state.
In Germany and Austria it is mentioned that the BBC was viewed as
an example.
The self-regulation of public service broadcasters is assessed ambiva-
lently. The possibility to include representatives of different societal
groups in the boards is positively evaluated. But the disadvantage is an
assumed insufficient enforcement of rules, which is believed to stem from
the double role as a strategic board and a self-regulation organization
on the one hand, and in the boards’ lacking independence of the organi-
zation on the other hand.
Conclusion
The results presented provide us some answers to the question of
whether or not the participation of the state in self-regulation is a key
success factor. The fundamental advantage of self- and co-regulation
is increased independence from the state. This may ensure the media’s
independence better than statutory regulation. However, the state re-
mains important. In the field of process regulation, self-regulation is
positively assessed but was introduced due to the threat of statutory
regulation. In contrast, in the domain of content regulation, self-regula-
tion is negatively assessed, while involvement of the state through co-
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Table 2. Types of process, content, and organization regulation.
Regulation of […]
Processes Content Organization
Type of media press, broadcast- broadcasting, internet public service
ing, Internet broadcasting
Role of the state mainly self-regula- mainly co-regulation co-regulation
tion
Reasons of threat of statutory ensure media’s indepen- ensure media’s
implementation regulation dence from state independence
from state
higher practical review fictional program- BBC as a role
expertise ming before dissemination model in Ger-
man-speaking
countriesdealing with media flexibility
ethics
Assessment mainly positive, mainly positive assessment ambivalent
especially inde- of CR positive: possi-
pendence from the mainly negative assessment bility to in-
state and accept- of SR clude repre-
ance by the regu- sentatives ofin part criticized: no posi-lated industry differenttive requirements possible
possibilities of societal groups
sanctioning are negative: insuf-
assessed as ficient enforce-
controversial ment of rules
regulation is seen as positive. In the domain of organization regulation,
co-regulation is not completely looked upon favorably either.
Apart from the question whether the state should be involved, the
interviews have shown that there are four other key success factors:
(1) Independence of self-regulation organizations from the regulated in-
dustry
(2) Acceptance of self-regulation by the regulated companies and profes-
sionals
(3) Sufficient funding and personnel resources
(4) Clear definition of the procedures and goals of the self-regulation
organization and its transparency to the public
With regard to the main question of this contribution, this means that
the direct involvement of the state through co-regulation is not necessar-
ily a mandatory key success factor of governance. Apart from the state,
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there are some other key success factors. Whether the state should be
involved in self-regulation depends rather on the domains of governance.
However, the state still remains important at least through its ability to
threaten the implementation of statutory regulation.
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Co-Regulation in European Union member states
THORSTEN HELD
Aim of the study
Regulation in general and regulation within the media sector in particu-
lar has to face the fact that new technologies and internationalization
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 08.12.17 16:31
356 Co-Regulation in European Union member states
have led to widespread and fundamental changes. These developments,
which are often described as a change of former industrial societies to
so-called information societies, represent a challenge for the regulating
states. Traditional regulation, though successful and efficient in the past,
might be unsuitable under changed circumstances. The role of the state
needs to be redefined. In some countries, the state has included non-
state regulation in its regulatory concept. The present study focuses on
the following questions:
(1) Which models of co-regulation do already exist within the member
states and selected non-EU States when it comes to media regula-
tion?
(2) How can efficiency and effectiveness of co-regulatory measures be
judged?
(3) What are the requirements of European Law that have to be kept in
mind when implementing models of co-regulation?
Reasons for shifting to new forms of regulation
When it comes to regulation, different concepts can be found. While
command-and-control regulation may be seen as a traditional form of
regulation, co-regulation seems to be a rather new approach that consists
of more than merely a combination of state regulation and self-regula-
tion. The growing interest in new regulatory concepts can be traced back
to findings on failures of traditional regulation. Studies have pinpointed
several reasons for the failure of traditional ‘command-and-control’
regulation (see Schulz and Held, 2004: 11) such as the fact that tradi-
tional regulation ignores the interests of the regulated objects (Mayntz,
1979: 55 ff.; Baldwin and Cave, 1999) and that initiative, innovation, and
commitment cannot be imposed by law (Mayntz, 1987)2, the increasing
knowledge gap of the regulating state (Ukrow, 2000), globalization3 as
well as difficulties in intervening in autonomous social systems (e. g.,
Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995).
Definition of ‘co-regulation’
Within the understanding of the study, co-regulation is a specific combi-
nation of state and non-state regulation. Based on an analysis of earlier
studies, the present study develops the following definition of co-regula-
tion (HBI and EMR, 2006: 35). The non-state component of the regula-
tory systems includes:
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(1) The creation of specific organizations, rules or processes
(2) To influence decisions by persons or, in the case of organizations,
decisions by or within such entities
(3) As long as this is performed, at least partly, by or within the organi-
zations or parts of society whose members are addressees of the
(non-state) regulation.
The non-state part has to be regulation in itself. There has to be some
influence on decisions of persons or, in the case of organizations, deci-
sions of, or within, such entities. In addition, this influence has to be
exerted not just case-by-case. In most countries, influence is exerted by
non-state organizations setting codes, rating content, or supervising the
industry. With regard to the link between a non-state regulatory system
and state regulation, one can speak of co-regulation if the following
criteria are met:
(1) The system is established to achieve public policy goals targeted at
social processes.
(2) There is a legal connection between the non-state regulatory system
and the state regulation.
(3) The state leaves discretionary power to a non-state regulatory
system.
(4) The state uses regulatory resources to influence the outcome of the
regulatory process (to guarantee the fulfillment of the regulatory
goals).
One main criterion is the existence of a legal connection between state
regulation and non-state regulation. This link can be a state act, but also
a contract or guidelines set by the state regulator. Another criterion is
that the state uses regulatory resources such as power or money to influ-
ence the outcome of the non-state regulatory process. In most countries,
this resource is the certification of non-state organizations or codes.
Other instruments may be the appointment of members of non-state
organizations and financing of non-state organizations. However, the
state has to leave discretionary power to the non-state regulation. Other-
wise, there would be no real division of work between the state side and
the non-state side.
Existing models
Different models of co-regulation exist in the member states of the Euro-
pean Union. However, they do not apply to all types of media. While a
tradition of pure self-regulation exists in the press sector, co-regulatory
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systems are in place in the sectors of broadcasting and film regulation,
in some states even in the field of internet regulation. When it comes to
the goals of regulation, co-regulatory measures are mainly used for the
protection of minors and the protection of consumers (the latter by
means of advertising rules).
Youth protection
In the area of youth protection, two different kinds of approaches exist:
In some states, there is a non-state organization that rates content and
decides whether the respective content is suitable for minors in specific
age brackets. Examples of this approach exist in Germany and Austria.
For the broadcasting sector in Germany, it is the task of an Einrichtung
der Freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle to classify content and to ensure the en-
forcement of rules. Furthermore, it may make exemptions to the water-
shed regulation for the broadcasting of movies, which had been given a
rating by the non-state body for movies in the past. However, instru-
ments are in place to regulate non-state regulation, of which the most
important is that Einrichtungen der Freiwilligen Selbstkontrolle need cer-
tification (for further details see HBI and EMR, 2006: 48 ff.; Schulz and
Held, 2006: 58).
In the areas of movies and computer games, non-state bodies are also
responsible for age classification (suitable for all children and adoles-
cents, six years and older, twelve years, sixteen years, or not suitable for
children and adolescents). Here, another tool of state involvement can
be found. Members of the examination boards are nominated by state
authorities. The examination boards include permanent representatives
of the state authorities (for further details see HBI and EMR, 2006:
54 ff.; Schulz and Held, 2006: 57). In Austria, the state authorities of the
Bundesländer (states) that are responsible for age classification as a rule
follow recommendations of the non-state Jugendmedienkommission
(JMK, Commission for the Protection of Minors against Improper Me-
dia Contents). As in the above-mentioned German system, the state
gains some influence on the non-state regulatory process by appointing
members of the non-state body. Representatives of the federal govern-
ment and the states are members of the JMK (for further details see HBI
and EMR, 2006: 43 ff.).
In other member states, the rating is done by the companies them-
selves based on coding forms developed by non-state organizations (as
in the Netherlands, in the United Kingdom, in Italy, and in Slovenia).
In some of these member states, it is also the task of non-state organiza-
tions to enforce compliance with the codes. A brief description of the
system in the Netherlands may illustrate this type of co-regulation. Non-
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state regulation is performed by the Nederlands Instituut voor de Classifi-
catie van Audiovisuele Media (NICAM, the Dutch Institute for the Clas-
sification of Audiovisual Media). The classification system called Kijk-
wijzer (in the double meaning of Watch wiser or Viewing guide) was
developed by independent experts and launched in 2001 by NICAM. It
introduces a uniform classification system for movies, TV, video, and
DVD. In this system, classification is done by the broadcasters, and film
and video companies themselves. Specially trained employees use a cod-
ing form to describe the content. A Kijkwijzer computer program then
determines the classification of a given production. By using special pic-
tograms, broadcasters, film and video companies inform the viewers of
the classification. As long as a provider is a member of NICAM, NI-
CAM is responsible for supervision of compliance including the hand-
ling of complaints. NICAM was accredited by a decision of the govern-
ment. In addition, the state authority responsible for regulating the media
was entrusted with the task of performing so-called meta supervision of NI-
CAM (for further details see HBI and EMR, 2006; Schulz and Held,
2006).
Protection of consumers by means of advertising rules
Concerning the protection of consumers by means of advertising rules,
regulatory systems exist within member states where non-state bodies set
codes and enforce compliance with these codes (as in the United King-
dom, in the Netherlands, and in Greece). In the United Kingdom, for
example, the state regulator, the Office of Communications (Ofcom), has
contracted out the setting up of the advertising codes and their enforce-
ment to different non-state organizations.
The Communications Act of 2003 requires the state regulator Ofcom
to consider the desirability of promoting and facilitating the develop-
ment and use of effective forms of self-regulation. Responsibility for
advertising content regulation (but not frequency or sponsorship) was
assigned to the non-state Advertising Standards Authority Broadcast
(ASA(B)) and Broadcast Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP).
Ofcom contracted out the function to set advertising codes to the
BCAP. Any changes of the codes require the consent of Ofcom. The
powers of handling and resolving complaints of breaches of the BCAP
Codes were contracted out to ASA(B) (for further details see HBI and
EMR, 2006: 90).
In some member states, non-state organizations offer a ‘pre-clearance’
of advertisements before these advertisements are published (in France
for example). In France, the state regulator Conseil supe´rieur de l’audiovi-
suel (CSA, Higher Council in Audiovisual Media) applies ex-post con-
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trol. Ex-ante control is performed by a non-state body, the Bureau de
ve´rification de la publicite´ (BVP, Advertising Verification Bureau). How-
ever, CSA can overrule the BVP’s decisions (for further details see HBI
and EMR, 2006).
Requirements of European law
As mentioned above, the planned changes of the ‘Television Without
Frontiers Directive’ will allow the use of co-regulation to transpose the
directive’s rules into national law. Apart from this, the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community leaves to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods to transpose directives into national law.
Therefore, it is generally possible to transpose European directives into
state law by means of co-regulation.
However, the European Court of Justice has stipulated certain
requirements that have to be met (see HBI and EMR, 2006: 156 ff.):
• One requirement is that national rules have to be transparent, clear,
and precise (see ECJ, 361/88, para. 24; C-220/94, para. 10).
• Another requirement is that a directive has to be implemented in an
effective and binding manner (see ECJ, C-59/89, para. 34; C-80/92,
para. 20; C-151/94, para. 18; C-296/01, para. 54; C-415/01, para. 21).
These requirements do not mean that a complete transformation of the
directive into state law is necessary. For example, agreements between
state and non-state organizations are sufficient (see Calliess and Ruffert
2007: Art. 249 EGV, para. 52).
Results of an impact assessment
To judge the effectiveness of co-regulatory approaches an impact assess-
ment was undertaken in the study.4 One principal finding of the impact
assessment5 is that there is no reason to assume that co-regulatory mod-
els as defined within this study are generally insufficient to implement
European directives (neither with regard to the effectiveness of regula-
tion nor the legal requirements). However, some requirements have to
be met:
• First, there have to be sufficient incentives for the industry to partici-
pate.
• Second, the different regulatory cultures have to be kept in mind when
designing a co-regulatory system. While the broadcasting industry, for
example, seems to welcome co-regulation as a form of deregulation,
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the internet industry is more skeptical about it because there is more
state intervention than in pure self-regulation.
• Third, the existing regulatory path has to be taken into account.
The chosen co-regulatory approach has to fit in the overall regulatory
framework in the given country.
• Fourth, effective and graduated sanctions have to be at the disposal
of the regulators in place.
• Finally, there has to be safety net in case non-state regulation should
fail.
Another finding of the impact assessment is that a great many of the
existing co-regulatory approaches lack transparency although transpar-
ency is both a requirement set by the European Court of Justice and a
democratic value protected by the national constitutions.
In addition, some systems are designed as closed shops. Interest
groups such as consumer groups are seldom included in the systems.
Notwithstanding these problems that can be overcome, co-regulatory
approaches are capable of fulfilling objectives such as the protection of
minors and the protection of consumers by means of advertising regula-
tion. Systems that exist for example in Germany, in the Netherlands, and
in the United Kingdom may serve as role models for the design of co-
regulatory approaches.
Notes
1. In May 2007, European Parliament and Council agreed on an amended proposal,
stating that “member states shall encourage co- and/or self-regulatory regimes at
national level”.
2. In addition, the state has to act before a trajectory has been laid out if the state
wants to influence the outcome of a process (‘preventive state’) (see Schuppert,
2001: 201 ff.).
3. This facilitates international ‘forum shopping’ to evade national regulations. In
addition, globalization has created an additional problem. While the economic sys-
tem now tends primarily toward multi-national or even global structures, legal
regulation is still mainly the preserve of the nation-states. Structures of non-govern-
mental law now have to be taken into account by nation-states (Teubner, 1997:
763 ff).
4. Besides desk research, an expert survey was conducted. For the methods of the
study, see HBI and EMR, 2006: 3 ff.
5. For further details see HBI and EMR, 2006: 108 ff.
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